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A little thing: a ponytail holder. A place: the abandoned soccer field in an 
abandoned town. Representations of a common object and a place can 
effectively evoke tragic events and contribute to the collective memory of a 
country that is trying to come to terms with its violent past. These examples 
are taken from a photo exhibit by Domingo Giribaldi created as a cultural 
intervention in the wake of the report of the Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which investigated the crimes against humanity 
perpetrated by the Shining Path and by the country’s armed forces during the 
1980s and 1990s.
1
 These two examples represent mechanisms frequently 
found in memorials to social trauma. By examining them I hope to shed 
some light on the way a community “remembers.” Our understanding of 
cultural memory is reflected in aesthetic choices that, I will argue throughout 
this essay, consistently embody mnemonic mechanisms highlighted by 
current research on cognition. Interventions like Giribaldi’s are able to 
produce vicarious memories in viewers by appealing to empathic responses 
to certain forms of representation. 
The ponytail holder is from a mass grave discovered in the highlands of 
Peru. All that is found is a heap of undistinguishable bones and other human 
remains, but a woman sees the little hair accessory and breaks down in tears. 
A plain little thing evokes the enormity of her loss. There is a metonymic 
aspect in the way objects represent absence: a pink ponytail holder stands for 
the girl who wore it, and when told that this was all her relatives had left 
with which to identify her, somehow we understand; somehow we are 
moved. The empty courtyards, kitchens, and playgrounds of the town of 
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Putis in Domingo Giribaldi’s photos speak of the desolation of a town 
emptied by a massacre. What were once places of human interaction and 
communal life are now empty spaces. These examples illustrate two ways in 
which memorials of social trauma succeed in transmitting strong emotions 
through mnemonic mechanisms. Memorials of social trauma often attempt 
to awaken forms of identification between the general public and those who 
experienced the traumatic event themselves. Most visitors to public 
memorials do not have any actual “memories” of the events commemorated. 
Yet, I contend, memorials have the power to produce in us “memory-like” 
effects, and the fact that we feel as if we “remember” arouses in us powerful 
feelings about events we have not experienced firsthand. Among the 
different mechanisms used to produce these effects, I will focus on two that I 
consider particularly effective: metonymy and the use of space.  
The present text takes as its premise the idea that there are cognitive 
operations similar to memory processes, which can be crucial in arousing 
empathy and understanding the pain of others. Although current research has 
not produced conclusive evidence on the cognitive aspects of empathy, 
many researchers believe that certain kinds of brain activity account for 
feelings of empathic identification: I can understand what somebody else 
feels because the parts of my brain that experience certain emotions become 
active when I recognize those emotions in others.
2
 In this essay I will argue 
that because empathy seems to imply visualizing or imagining the feelings 
of others, the cognitive aspects of empathy appeal at least partially to the 
same mechanisms that are involved in recollection. After all, memory is a 
kind of visualization, a kind of replaying the past in my brain, which also 
creates neural activity in a vicarious way: the feeling that we are “reliving” 
an experience might be similar to the feeling of living someone else’s 
experience.
3 
We commonly say that a society needs to “remember.” After a 
community experiences social trauma, a public articulation of the past 
should allow the community to identify with those who suffered the most. 
To feel with others in this case would imply recognizing their painful 
memories as being painful not just for them but for the community as a 
whole. While the scientific evidence is still controversial, we can see how 
memorials of social trauma activate empathic feelings through mechanisms 
similar to those involved in the formulation of our own memories.  
The word “empathy” itself entered the language of psychology through 
Edward B. Titchener’s interpretation of the concept of Einfühlung described 
by Theodor Lipps, who was in turn elaborating on Robert Vischer’s 
aesthetic theories.
4
 Although this etymology does not seem to be relevant for 
the current understanding of the term “empathy,” it is significant that the 
word originated as an attempt to theorize the viewer’s relationship to a work 
of art. Memorials of social trauma take on artistic forms that attempt to 
awake in viewers an intimate understanding of the pain of others. 
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The feelings aroused in us by a public memorial are not memories: I 
cannot “remember” something that I did not experience. If we consider the 
relationship between “actual memories” and “actual experiences,” however, 
we can see that the process of remembering resembles the process of 
imagining and understanding in ways that make the rise of empathic feelings 
toward the experiences of others almost a biological process. Empathy 
happens in our brains the same way that memory does. And if that is the 
case, we need to understand the mechanisms that succeed in stirring up our 
emotions about things that did not happen to us. 
Many others have made extremely important contributions to the 
understanding of this feeling I am calling “empathy” in times when our 
world seems plagued by traumatic events. Works such as Susan Sontag’s 
last book, Regarding the Pain of Others, and Marianne Hirsch’s concept of 
“postmemory” reveal the need to conceptualize the position from which to 
address social trauma when we have not ourselves been direct victims of the 
events. Kaja Silverman coined the term “heteropathic recollection” to talk 
about “implanted memories” that might allow us to “participate in the 
desires, struggles, and sufferings of the other” (185). She writes about texts 
or images capable of “implanting in the viewer or reader ‘synthetic’ 
memories—libidinally saturated associative clusters which act 
like . . . mnemic elements” (185). In a similar fashion, Alison Landsberg 
uses the term “prosthetic memory” to explain how one “sutures himself or 
herself into a larger history” (2). These critics reject the idea of appropriating 
the position of the victim, and it is clear that my feelings—as I am moved by 
the little ponytail holder—are not the feelings of a mother—or a sister, or an 
aunt—who has lost a child. But Hirsch’s intuition that “I can also 
‘remember’ the suffering of others” (9) might be grounded in processes that 
occur in our brains. 
Many scientists now see “recalling” as an activation of a specific pattern 
of neurons, but they see that pattern not as an imprint ready to be retrieved 
but as a sort of network that can be activated by partial cues (Nalbatian 139). 
When this network is activated, the same cells that first reacted to an 
experience seem to fire up again. This research offers an explanation of the 
feeling that we are reliving an intense experience when we remember it, but 
it also suggests that there might be mechanisms that activate our neurons in 
ways that are similar to the way they were activated in the original 
experience of others. From this perspective, empathy takes place in our 
brains and is awakened by stimuli familiar in our models of perception, such 
as our capacity to navigate space and to establish associations between, for 
example, part and whole, object and user, effect and cause. 
The examples cited above, the picture of the ponytail holder and of 
familiar spaces now abandoned, speak of the intuition of the photographer in 
conveying a sense of loss, appealing to mechanisms often used in 
memorializing social trauma. Those two mechanisms can be found in other 
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forms of commemorations. In Berlin, for example, a city aware of its 
conflictive past, we find the use both of space and of metonymy to 
remember Holocaust victims. Space is used to evoke an aura, a presence that 
has been lost by displaying plaques in certain Berlin streets with the names 
and ages of those captured during the Nazi regime and taken to 
concentration camps: as we read the plaques, we realize they inhabited the 
space we are now occupying. We are in the space from which they were 
forcibly removed, turning a place of belonging into a site of violent 
alienation. The metonymic mechanism that refers to the user by the object 
used is also common. In the Jewish Museum in Berlin, quotidian objects, 
such as a toy or a diary, help the public imagine the lives of their owners, 
mourning their deaths as their lived experiences are invoked by the objects. 
Why and how can a thing or a street or a plaque with a name bring someone 
else’s experience to mind? 
Brain research tends to distinguish between emotional components and 
cognitive components of memory. In her study of memory in literature, 
Suzanne Nalbatian gives a clear and concise account of how neuroscience 
sees emotional and cognitive memories. The sensory-emotional component 
is usually associated with the function of the amygdala. Fact-based, 
cognitive memory is associated with the hippocampus (Nalbatian 135). 
However, even when studying emotionally charged memories, scientists 
tend to focus on the auto-associative network of the neurons of the 
hippocampus. Psychologists and neuroscientists use the term episodic 
memory to describe the autobiographical memories that are rich in 
associations to context, place, or environment, and which are activated by 
“retrieval cues.” In Nalbatian’s words, “this type of long-term episodic 
memory is characterized by a richness of phenomenological detail, a sense 
of reliving the experience, a sense of a travel through time, and a feeling of 
exact reproduction of the past” (137).  
The fact that the firing of neurons in “episodic” memory occurs in the 
hippocampus is also relevant, as this area of the brain has been identified as 
being activated by navigation through space in the present, by the memory 
of navigating a space in the past, and by predicting the results of actions 
(Miller 1281). Remembering would therefore suppose both the connections 
made out of partial cues—which I see as a synecdoche of the mind, the fact 
that we can reconstruct the whole from the part—and it would be grounded 
in the perception of space. If what happens when we remember is that 
networks of neurons are connected in our hippocampus and respond to cues 
and space, it is possible to imagine that certain stimuli might activate similar 
processes in us, even if we did not experience certain events directly.
5
 
To understand these mechanisms, I will examine a few examples of 
memorials of social trauma that succeed in creating empathy either by an 
activation of metonymic associations or by the perception of space they 
create in the public.  
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The American Heritage Dictionary defines metonymy as “[a] figure of 
speech in which one word or phrase is substituted for another with which it 
is closely associated” (1106). A word stands for another word. Yet even 
those who try to explain metonymy as a literary trope or as a linguistic 
phenomenon end up facing the fact that we are dealing with an 
extralinguistic reality. Hugh Bredin accepts that “we need to assume that 
metonymical relations are relations between things, not between words” 
(52). Anna Papafragou comes to a similar conclusion when trying to explain 
the way metonymy works: “I take it that metonymy is grounded in a more 
general human cognitive tendency, according to which an individual or 
object in the world may be identified through one salient property it 
possesses” (181). We see the substitution of a word for another word, but we 
establish a referent through a signifier not normally associated to it thanks to 
the fact that this previously unassociated object has a particular relationship 
to a first object that is in fact normally associated to that signifier. In 
memorials of social trauma, objects that probably can be described as relics 
present themselves as signifiers for that which has been lost and cannot be 
named. 
Roman Jakobson’s classic paper on aphasia becomes particularly 
relevant when trying to understand the way objects fulfill a metonymic 
relationship to loss in the cases I am considering. Jakobson noted that some 
aphasics could produce grammatically correct sentences but were unable to 
select the right word, and would say glass for window, or heaven for god. He 
called this disturbance a “similarity disorder,” in opposition to a “contiguity 
disorder,” organizing aphasia around a metaphoric pole and a metonymic 
pole. Metonymical responses, Jakobson discovered, “combine and contrast 
the positional similarity with semantic contiguity” (91). When the “right 
word” cannot be uttered, another word—one that might be used in a 
sentence with the missing word—is used instead. But even then Jakobson 
was not only talking about words, but about representation in general. 
Jakobson himself established a link between his discoveries on these 
processes and psychoanalysis: for him, Freud’s understanding of 
displacement and condensation in the interpretation of dreams reveals 
metonymic processes of symbolization, while identification and symbolism 
are manifestations of a metaphoric pole (95). 
When we talk about metonymy, we are using a linguistic mechanism to 
describe a very general way of representing and understanding the world. 
Perhaps we learn to represent like this because it is ingrained in the faculty 
of language. Or perhaps is the other way around: this is a linguistic 
mechanism, because language employs mechanisms that are common to a 
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general human way of understanding reality. Recent studies in neural 
processing of language show that “solving” metonymies seems to integrate 
semantic language comprehension with “world knowledge” (Rapp et al. 
203). When a little ponytail holder evokes a dead girl and we understand 
loss and grief, we are experiencing a metonymic process that in turn 
activates a “memory-like” effect. The hair accessory stands—
metonymically—for the person who wore it, and it works as a memory cue 
not just for the person but for the loss, for the absence of the body. 
In 1996 Edmund Rolles suggested that a partial memory cue can 
contribute to the formation of long-term episodic memories in the auto-
associative network of the hippocampus. I imagine this as a synecdoche in 
the brain. A certain understanding of memory sees it as dependent upon a 
network of connections, involved in a patterned activity of the brain. The 
psychologist James L. McClelland describes the reconstructive memory 
retrieval process in these terms: 
 
It . . . involves contributions from background knowledge based on 
information acquired very gradually over the course of a lifetime of 
experience directly within the neocortical system. . . . [W]e cannot see 
remembering as recall, but as a synthesis of contributions from many 
different sources of information. (qtd. in Nalbatian 152) 
 
We can conclude, then, that when we perceive a ponytail holder as a 
signifier, it also acts as a retrieval cue in our brains, activating a set of 
networks that is felt as a memory. 
The vision of “plain things” is extremely powerful in memorials of 
social trauma. When the section of the Jewish Museum in Berlin dedicated 
to exile shows everyday objects left behind by those who had to flee it does 
not mention the pain and suffering they went through. The objects, however, 
allow the spectator to imagine the lives that were destroyed. The belongings 
of those who are no more seem to embody their absence and offer a material 
testimony to a body that is no longer there. 
In Giribaldi’s exhibit a series of plain things reveal to us the material 
factuality of loss. A little boy’s garments, a religious medal, a sweater with a 
weathered pink ribbon, a ponytail holder—all these things were on 
children’s bodies. Those children were once real. They might have rejoiced 
at having a ribbon in a sweater or a medal of Our Lady of Guadalupe, and 
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Pili Mili / Hair Elastic 
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Giribaldi’s photos were taken in collaboration with the Peruvian 
Forensic Anthropology Team (EPAF), and the objects he photographed are 
considered evidence in the process of identifying the victims. Jose Pablo 
Baraybar, director of EPAF, writes eloquently about these objects and about 
how relatives of the disappeared react to them: 
 
They caress their clothes, those they once made, washed and ironed. The 
threads whisper in their ears, the strands, the weave, the yarn, the 
stitches and the seams. . . . Is this the sleeve that covers this bone? Does 
this bone form this arm? Is this tooth the one this smile is missing? We 
have to reconstruct, paste and compose, but can we bring back life, the 
smile, the harmony of those shapes, the agility of that arm? (EPAF) 
 
In a review covering the exhibit of Giribaldi’s pictures in New York, 
Baraybar describes for the reporter the impact of seeing survivors identify 
the garments recovered from the mass grave in Putis: “It was incredible. A 
woman ran to a sweater and said, ‘This is my weaving. I gave this fabric to 
my cousin for her wedding.’ And one by one they recognized the garments 
of nineteen of the bodies” (Sterin Pensel) (my translation). 
While forensic anthropologists struggle to reconstruct not just the 
identity of the victim but also the cause of death from meager remains, we 
find many testimonies of relatives for whom the flood of emotion of finally 
identifying the remains of the disappeared loved one derives from 
recognizing a plain thing they carried: a piece of garment, a watch, a shoe. In 
“La polera azul,” Marta Dillon recounts the bittersweet relief of finally 
accepting that the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team had identified the 
remains of her mother, disappeared during the Dirty War, when she verified 
that the blue sweater they found was the one her mother had been wearing at 
the time of her disappearance.  
Santiago Porter’s photographic project, La ausencia (Absence), revolves 
precisely around the metonymic power of plain things to invoke lost loved 
ones.
6
 A graphic memorial to the victims of the bomb that destroyed the 
Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in 1994, La ausencia 
confronts the viewer with sober black-and-white pictures of relatives of the 
victims paired with a photograph of a random object. Under each pair of 
pictures, a legend explains the relationship between the two images: “Aída is 
the widow of Abraham Jaime Plaksin. Abraham Jaime was 62 years old and 
worked in the Culture Department of the AMIA. Aída keeps his yarmulke.” 
In some cases the objects are pieces of garments or accessories the victims 
were wearing when they were killed. In others, the object chosen by the 
survivor is a favorite thing the victim cherished, such as the porcelain cup 
that belonged to the grandmother of Dora Shulman de Belgoroski or the 
football of five-year-old Sebastián Barreiros, killed when he was walking by 
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the AMIA with his mother. The photographs were taken between 2001 and 
2004. 
In all these cases the survivors had held on to certain things as 
embodiments of their loss: the watch he was wearing, the little bottle of the 
perfume she wore that day, the paint brushes he abandoned, the college 
essay she was writing. Porter’s work communicates the pain of the survivors 
by juxtaposing their grieving portraits with images of things invested with a 
power of representation through metonymic association. How can you 
represent that which is not there? How do you represent absence? La 
ausencia reminds the spectators that the massacre is not something of the 
past: by the tenth anniversary, nobody had been charged and brought to 
justice, but those killed are still gone. Through Porter’s juxtaposition of the 
portrait of a middle-aged woman and the photo of a deflated little football, 
we empathize with the pain of a mother who has lost her son. We understand 
that the dirty old toy is a constant reminder of the absence of the child. We 





The idea that location and space are central to recollection is not new. In De 
oratore Cicero told the story of Simonides, who was attending a banquet 
when the building collapsed; he was able to identify the bodies that could 
not be recognized by remembering where his fellow banqueters were sitting 
(Yates 2). Our knowledge of the world is ingrained in spatial context, and 
the story of Simonides exemplifies how explicit recollection might be 
determined by spatial cues. On the other hand, the experience of space is 
fundamental to implicit, procedural memory too: occupying a space, moving 
about it, becomes part of “automatically” performing daily tasks. Our lives 
are shaped and limited by the ways we inhabit space. The examinations of 
the ways we experience space range from approaches such as Henri 
Lefevre’s The Production of Space and Michel de Certeau’s The Practice of 
Everyday Life to neuroscientific experiments comparing mental exploration 
of the representation of a space to its physical exploration.
7
 The relevance of 
places, landscapes, architecture, and space in our ability to represent and 
remember our experiences surfaces in a number of disciplines, from human 
geography to the cognitive sciences. 
In his introduction to a special issue of Representations entitled 
Grounds for Remembering, Thomas W. Laqueur tries to elucidate the 
relationship of space with the memory of social trauma: “a place that at one 
moment was the venue for something—horrible, magnificent, world-
historical—that cries out to be remembered, exists in time, which inexorably 
washes it of the marks it bore” (1). But it is the fact that place remains even 
when stripped of any signs of the traumatic event that seems to invest places 
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with a certain aura. The essays Laqueur introduces are wary of the “sacral, 
trascendental demands, that spaces seem to be making” (1), but they cannot 
extricate themselves from them. 
To a certain extent, Laqueur is exploring the fact that, in the dichotomy 
between history and memory created by our current distrust of traditional 
historical methods for encompassing the experience of the past, spaces are 
seen as material witnesses to events.
8
 The term “site of memory” has 
become a recurrent trope in memory studies, but the notion itself is 
problematic.  
When Pierre Nora uses the term “lieux de mémoire” or “site of 
memory,” he refers to places that crystallize and secrete memory precisely 
because historical continuity seems to be otherwise endangered: 
 
These lieux de mémoire are fundamentally remains, the ultimate 
embodiments of a memorial consciousness that has barely survived in a 
historical age that calls out for memory because it has abandoned 
it. . . . Museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, 
depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, fraternal orders—these are the 
boundary stones of another age, illusions of eternity. . . . It is the 
nostalgic dimension of these devotional institutions that makes them 
seem beleaguered and cold—they mark the rituals of a society without 
ritual. (12) 
 
Nora sees an artificial will to remember in societies that are too 
concerned with change and transformation. The mere existence of lieux de 
mémoire, in Nora’s view, reveals that, without a “commemorative 
vigilance,” memory would be swept away by history. 
Commemorative spaces work in a variety of ways that reflect our 
understanding of the power of the spatial experience to elicit either memory 
or empathic feelings. Spaces designated as sites of memory engage the 
public in different ways: by reminding us of the events that took place there; 
by recovering a traumatic site and reconfiguring it to foster communal life 
and collective memory beyond the traumatic events (traditions, festivals, 
etc.)
9
; and by creating a physical environment purposefully designed to 
provoke emotional reactions, either negative ones such as claustrophobia, 
agoraphobia, or vertigo, or positive ones, such as sense of direction, a sense 
of calm, a sense of peace. 
The little plaques in the streets of Berlin informing us that here, for 
example, a young man was removed from his home and taken to a 
concentration camp turn the space into a site of memory: it happened here. 
The idea of aura that Walter Benjamin applies to that which is lost in 
mechanical reproduction—in the Benjaminian conception of the work of 
art—is linked to its uniqueness and permanence. Sites of memory aspire to 
the auratic. They require a presence, the physical experience of the space. 
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In that sense, spatial design is capable of creating an “aura” that is not 
necessarily historical or even referential. In the Jewish Museum in Berlin, 
for example, Daniel Libeskind, the architect, created a specific feeling 
through an experience of space that deliberately avoids reference. Libeskind 
explains his intention in a text right outside the Holocaust Tower: “Inside 
this place we are cut off from the everyday life of the city outside and from a 
view of that city. We can hear sounds and see light but we cannot reach the 
outside world. So it was for those confined before and during the deportation 
and in the camps themselves.” Libeskind wants the visitors to experience in 
their bodies those same feelings of loneliness and isolation that prisoners 
would have felt in the concentration camps. A similar principle guides the 
Garden of Exile in the same museum. Libeskind explains that his intention 
was to “completely disorientate the visitor” and to reproduce “a shipwreck 
of history.” The garden is on a twelve-degree gradient, and the space is filled 
with forty-nine concrete stelae that rise up and obstruct vision. The terrain 
feels unstable and one cannot see where one is going. Libeskind wants to 
foster empathy at a very physical level by eliciting in spectators feelings that 
the people in concentration camps and in exile might have felt. In this way 
he makes our bodies “remember” the pain of others. 
In Peru in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 
report estimating 70,000 dead and disappeared during the internal war of the 
1980s and 1990s, hundreds of memory sites have been created.
10
 However, 
an intense public debate arose regarding the construction of a museum of 
memory in Lima. Discussing the terms of this debate elucidates some of the 
ways we try to engage space in the articulation of social trauma.
11
 This 
museum is still under construction, and even its name seems to be a 
contentious issue: in recent months the name was changed from El Lugar de 
la Memoria (simply “the place—or site—of memory”) to include the terms 
“tolerance” and “social inclusion”: El Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y 
la Inclusión Social. 
The architectural project that won the public contest proclaims the need 
to express human dignity in a way that articulates the interaction of the users 
of the space with the building’s location and surroundings. The building will 
be located in one of Lima’s most impressive landscapes, the cliffs of Costa 
Verde in Miraflores. The project presents some ideas about the spaces it will 
create, such as the “esplanade of reconciliation” or “the site of grief.” But a 
complete museographic script is still not available, and it is not clear what 
kinds of exhibits will find a home in this museum. (See María Eugenia 
Ulfe’s note published in NoticiasSer, www.noticiasser.pe/print/2132). The 
official website for the museum tries to address some of these concerns and 
lists the following tasks for the organizing committee: designing the 
museographic script and its collections, programming temporary exhibits 
and educational workshops, constructing a network of memory sites in Peru, 
and, in connection with other international initiatives, coordinating its work 
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with victims’ and human rights organizations. One prominent task, on which 
I elaborate below, is to designate a prominent, permanent, space for 
Yuyanapaq: Para recorder (Yuyanapaq: In Order to Remember), the photo 
exhibit that provided a visual narrative for the Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission report. 
Although the museum presents itself as an attempt to create an auratic 
experience of reflection, it is viewed with skepticism by some who are 
suspicious that such gallery exhibitions are simply a way for privileged 




Yuyanapaq was the photo exhibit put together by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Peru with the intention of creating a “visual 
narrative” that would convey the findings of their report. The curators and 
museographers were intentionally “telling a story” using a photographic 
archive of the twenty years of violence documented in the report. But their 
use of space in their first installation in Lima was almost as relevant in the 
telling of the story as the images depicted in the photos. After searching for 
an appropriate site for the exhibit for six months, they decided on Casa Riva 
Agüero in Chorrillos. Casa Riva Agüero now belongs to the Peruvian 
Catholic University. It used to be the summer home of José de la Riva 
Agüero, a major figure in Peruvian conservative Hispanism in the early 
twentieth century. Chorrillos, formerly an elegant beach resort in the 
outskirts of Lima, ended up becoming a lower-middle-class neighborhood 
when the city started growing in every possible direction due to numerous 
internal migratory waves. In the last decades, those migrations were related 
to the displacement of populations under fire from both the Shining Path and 
state forces. 
Without exception, reviews of the exhibit noted that the dilapidated state 
of the once luxurious building echoed the Peruvian national crisis. 
Whitewashed walls and dirt floors alongside marble hallways embodied the 
radical differences between Peruvian social classes. The exhibit was 
organized both chronologically and thematically. The pictures were framed 
by texts that contextualized them within the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s narrative: charts of the main political events during the 
twenty years studied in the report, fragments of political analysis, videos. 
The Yuyanapaq exhibit consisted, above all, of an experience: it involved a 
presence, a material location, and a journey through a narrative. Visitors 
made a pilgrimage to this house that was almost in ruins, entered through the 
back alley, and were guided through rooms and hallways and courtyards, in 
order to remember the past. 
The exhibit could not be maintained in Casa Riva Agüero, where it had 
been privately funded, so it closed there and reopened in Peru’s National 
Museum.
13
 The effort to build a memory museum is in part a result of the 
search for a space to house these memories. The debates around the planning 
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of the museum show that memory sites are contentious articulations of the 
past. 
The spaces captured by Domingo Giribaldi’s photographs are quite 
different from official memory sites and embody the sense of loss in a 
different way. The photographs of Putis confront the viewer with landscapes 
and empty spaces that communicate precisely through the way they have 
been stripped of presence. These images convey the auratic because they stir 
in the viewer the uncanny feeling of spaces that should be inhabited and are, 
nonetheless, empty: the hearth, an improvised soccer field, a courtyard. To 
talk about aura in photographs seems inconsistent with the idea that 
mechanical reproduction gains in distribution range but loses “presence.” 
Struggling to clarify the auratic sense we get from some photographs, when 
he had been theorizing about the way mechanical reproduction leaves the 
aura behind, Walter Benjamin referred to Eugene Atget’s photographs of 
Paris at the turn of the twentieth century:  
 
It has quite justly said of him that he photographed [Paris’s streets] like 
scenes of crime. The scene of a crime, too, is deserted; it is 
photographed for the purpose of establishing evidence. With Atget, 
photographs become standard evidence for historical occurrences, and 
acquire a hidden political significance. . . . They stir the viewer; he feels 
challenged by them in a new way. (226) 
 
In the case of Giribaldi’s photographed spaces, the viewer is faced with 
lived spaces becoming lieux de mémoire, the scenes of social and political 
crimes. Though quite unlike the monument or the dedicated museum, by 
capturing a sense of space these images still convey the aura of presence that 




El juego de la vida / The Game of Life 
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Domingo Giribaldi’s photos of the things recovered from the mass grave 
and of the empty spaces of Putis awaken in viewers forms of identification 
that build up a sense that the loss needs to be shared, that the trauma affects 
a society as a whole. Metonymy and spatial experience function as 





Partido sin final / The Endless Game 
 
If we accept the need for collective memory, we need to understand the 
relationship between the ways the individual recalls his or her own 
experiences and the ways we remember with others. This implies 
establishing connections between memory and empathy and the different 
mechanisms that activate them. Metonymy and space are two of these 
mechanisms, and their frequent use in memorials of social trauma attests to 
the fact that people understand them as contributing to memory-like 
empathic feelings. Studying these and other mechanisms displayed in 
memorials of social trauma will help us understand what we mean when we 
talk about collective memory. 
 
Notes 
1. An abbreviated version of the report is available under the title Hatun Willakuy. The 
pictures of objects retrieved from the mass grave were taken by Domingo Giribaldi. 
The photos in his exhibit Si no vuelvo, búsquenme en Putis activate a sense of 
profound loss through the representation both of space and of common objects. The 
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catalogue of his exhibit can be found at www.hemi.nyu.edu/hemi/en/e72-putis-
gallery-giribaldi. The recovery of these remains and many others in the country are 
the result of the work of the Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF, 
Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team). Ash Kosiewicz’s note for Upsidedown 
World reports on this particular case, and information on EPAF’s work can be found 
at their website: www.epafperu.org/. Rocío Silva Santisteban wrote eloquently about 
abjection in the treatment of human remains in mass graves at the time of this 
discovery in her weekly column Kolumna Okupa. 
2. Most of the current research relies on fMRI evidence that observing or imagining 
someone else’s emotional state produces neural activity corresponding to the direct 
experience of those emotions. On the one hand, however, the evidence is 
circumscribed by the limited formulations of the experiments, and on the other hand, 
defining empathy when observing neural activation itself becomes problematic: do 
observers feel distress for themselves, or do they actually “share” someone else’s 
pain? Another recent line of research in neuroscience related to the idea of empathy 
has attempted to identify “mirror neurons” in human beings. While “mirror 
neurons,” visuomotor neurons activated both by actions and by observation of these 
actions, have been identified in macaques, the evidence produced by research in 
humans is still inconclusive. Evaluations of the advances in the research on the 
cognitive neuroscience of empathy can be found in Gerdes, Lietz, and Segal; Singer 
and Lamm; and Nakao and Itakura. A review of the evidence for mirror neurons in 
humans is presented by Turella, Pierno, Tubladi, and Castiello. 
3. In the last decade, numerous experiments have attempted to use imaging of neural 
activity to record the way the retrieval of memories simulates the processes used in 
encoding memories (what we register when we first experience them). An example 
of this kind of experiment can be found in Nyberg, Habib, McIntosh, and Tulving. 
4. Gustave Jahoda’s article “Theodor Lipps and the Shift from ‘Sympathy’ to 
‘Empathy’” gives a detailed account of the history of the term from its conception in 
the theory of aesthetics to its current use in psychology and behavioral studies. 
5. The reports on experiments that I have found so far work with neural activation and 
memory on the one hand and neural activation and empathy on the other hand. I 
have not found reports on experiments equating activation during recollection with 
activation when witnessing somebody else’s experience.  
6. The complete set of photographs can be found at Porter’s website: 
www.santiagoporter.com/ausencia.php. 
7. A 2011 study by David C. Rowland, Yanovich, and Kentros, for example, finds that 
rats need to actually occupy a space to be able to have a stable hippocampal 
representation of it. They might have a representation of the space by seeing it, but 
this representation remains plastic until they actually explore it (Rowland, Yanovich, 
and Kentros). 
8. Laqueur also notes the irony of the current debate in view of the traditional 
understanding of history: history was created to expand the limits of memory, to 
keep records of that which could not be remembered (1). 
9. The research coordinated by Felix Reátegui and published under the title Los sitios 
de la memoria: Procesos sociales de la conmemoración en el Perú gives a nuanced 
understanding of the resemantization of spaces in the aftermath of politically 
charged debates on memory. 
10. There are two websites that keep records of memory sites around the country: 
Espacios de Memoria en el Perú, www.espaciosdememoria.pe/index2.html, and 
Sitios de Memoria, www.aprodeh.org.pe/sitiomemoria/index.html. 
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11.  These debates are common in transitional societies whenever a space is designated 
as a memorial of social trauma. Examples range from the discussions about 
Argentina’s Parque de la Memoria and Espacio de Memoria y Derechos Humanos 
(ex-ESMA) to the debates over Ground Zero in Manhattan. 
12.  Among the many objections that Cynthia Milton and Maria Eugenia Ulfe express in 
their article is the fact that the museum is being built in a place disconnected from 
any real memories. They do not claim that all memory sites need to be located in 
places that actually witness traumatic events, but for them the place needs to have a 
connection with the public sphere to articulate the community. They find that, for 
example, the location of the sculpture El ojo que llora, which is built of stones 
carved with the names of the victims of violence, is more appropriate. The Campo 
de Marte, the space chosen for the sculpture, is frequently used for popular public 
events, and the fact that the sculpture has been vandalized several times is proof, for 
them, of how it engages the contentious memories of Peruvian society. 
13.  In a review of the new space that houses the exhibit, I discussed some of the issues 
created by the new environment for the show, especially the impact of the brutalist 
architecture and of the presence of the state in the presentation of the images. 
 
Works Cited 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” 
Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New 
York: Schocken, 1988. 217–252. Print. 
Bredin, Hugh. “Metonymy.” Poetics 5.1 (1984): 45–58. Print. 
De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988. Print.  
Dillon, Marta. “La polera azul.” Página 12, 7 January 2011. Web. 10 April 2012. 
EPAF. Si no vuelvo, búsquenme en Putis. Introd. José Pablo Baraybar. Catalogue. Web. 
10 April 2012. 
Gerdes, Karen E., Cynthia A. Lietz, and Elizabeth A. Segal. “Measuring Empathy in the 
21st Century: Development of an Empathy Index Rooted in Social Cognitive 
Neuroscience and Social Justice.” Social Work Research 35.2 (2011): 83–93. Print. 
Hirsch, Marianne. Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. Print. 
Jakobson, Roman. “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances.” 
Fundamentals of Language. Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle. New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter, 2002. 67–92 Print. 
Jahoda, Gustav. “Theodor Lipps and the Shift from ‘Sympathy’ to ‘Empathy.’” Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 41.2 (2005): 151–63. Print. 
Kosiewicz, Ash. “Return to Putis: EPAF Resumes Exhumations of Mass Graves.” 
Upsidedown World, 18 June 2008. Web. 10 April 2012. 
Landsberg, Alison. Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance 
in the Age of Mass Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Print. 
Laqueur, Thomas W. “Introduction to Special Issue: Grounds for Remembering.” 
Representations 69 (2000): 1–8. Print. 
Lefevre, Henri. The Production of Space. Malden: Blackwell, 1991. Print.  
McClelland, James L. “Constructive Memory and Memory Distortions: A Parallel-
Distributed Processing Approach.” Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and 
89 ♦ PLAIN THINGS AND SPACE 
 
HIOL ♦ Hispanic Issues On Line ♦ Spring 2014 
Societies Reconstruct the Past. Ed. Daniel L. Schacter. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995. 69–90. Print. 
Miller, Greg. “Hippocampal Firing Patterns Linked to Memory Recall.” Science 321 
(2008): 1280–81. Web. 10 April 2012. 
Milton, Cynthia, and Maria Eugenia Ulfe. “¿Y, después de la verdad? El espacio público 
y las luchas por la memoria en la post CVR, Perú.” After Truth. E-misférica 7.2 
(Winter 2010). Web. 13 May 2011. 
Nakao, Hisashi, and Shoji Itakura. “An Integrated View of Empathy: Psychology, 
Philosophy, and Neuroscience.” Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 
43.1 (2009): 42–52. Print. 
Nalbatian, Suzanne. Memory in Literature: From Rousseau to Neuroscience. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print.  
Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 
26 (1989): 7–24. Print.  
Nyberg, Lars, Reza Habib, Anthony R. McIntosh, and Endel Tulving. “Reactivation of 
Encoding-Related Brain Activity during Memory Retrieval.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 97.20 (2000): 11120–
24. Web. 20 April 2012. 
Papafragou, Anna. “On Metonymy.” Lingua 99 (1996): 169–95. Print.  
Porter, Santiago. La ausencia. Web. 20 April 2012. 
Rapp, Alexander M., Michael Erb, Wolfgang Grodd, Mathias Bartels, and Katja Markert. 
“Neural Correlates of Metonymy Resolution.” Brain and Language 119.3 (2011): 
196–205. Print. 
Reátegui, Félix. Los sitios de la memoria: Procesos sociales de la conmemoración en el 
Perú. Lima: Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos; Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2010. Print.  
Rolls, Edmund T. “A Theory of Hippocampal Function in Memory.” Hippocampus, 6 
(1996): 601–20. Print. 
Rowland, David C., Yeizaveta Yanovich, and Clifford G. Kentros. “A Stable 
Hippocampal Representation of a Space Requires Its Direct Experience.” PNAS 
108.35 (2011). Web. 20 April 2012. 
Silva Santisteban, Rocío. “Putis un caso de basurización.” Kolumna Okupa 22 June 2008. 
Web.20 April 2012. 
Singer, Tania, and Claus Lamm. “The Social Neuroscience of Empathy.” Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 1156 (2009): 81–96. Print. 
Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Picador, 2003. Print.  
Sterin Pensel, Silvina. “Hacer historia desenterrando otras.” El Diario NY, 10 Oct. 2009. 
Web. 20 April 2012. 
Turella, Luca, Andrea C. Pierno, Federico Tubaldi, and Umberto Castiello. “Mirror 
Neurons in Humans: Consistent or Confounding Evidence?” Brain and Language 
108 (2008): 10–21. Print.  
Ulfe, Maria Eugenia. “Un guión museográfico sobre el pasado reciente para el Perú.” 
NoticiasSer, 13 May 2011. Web. 2.0 April 2012 




SAONA ♦ 90 
 
 
HIOL ♦ Hispanic Issues On Line ♦ Spring 2014 
Saona, Margarita. “Plain Things and Space: Metonymy and Aura in Memorials of 
Social Trauma.” Layers of Memory and the Discourse of Human Rights: Artistic and 
Testimonial Practices in Latin America and Iberia. Ed. Ana Forcinito. Hispanic Issues 
On Line (Spring 2014): 73–90. Web. 
 
 
